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APPEAL OF ERRORS IN THE ABSENCE
OF OBJECTION-PENNSYLVANIA'S
"FUNDAMENTAL ERROR" DOCTRINE'
The Pennsylvania courts have established the rule that objection must be taken at the trial level to an alleged error for it
to serve as the basis for reversing the decision. 2 The rule rests
on the rationale that "[a] party may not sit silent and take his
chances of a verdict, and then, if it is adverse, complain of a
matter which, if an error, would have been immediately rectified
and made harmless."3 To this rule, however, is applied the "fundamental error" doctrine. As stated by Chief Justice Bell in Commonwealth v. Williams:4 "[The] general rule will not be applied
where there is basic and fundamental error which affects the
merits or justice of the case .

. . ."5

Hence an error not objected

to can serve as the basis for a reversal if the above requirements
mentioned by Chief Justice Bell are met.
Three recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
have centered on the "fundamental error" doctrine.6 These cases
1. While the problems examined in this Comment are common to
both civil and criminal cases, the paper will focus only on criminal appeals.

Some of the policy reasons discussed are inapplicable to civil cases; therefore, the recommendations are only submitted for use in criminal cases.
Further, no distinction is made between errors in the body of the trial and
those in the trial judge's charge.
2. E.g., Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694 (1954);
Commonwealth v. Razmus, 210 Pa. 609, 60 A. 264 (1905); Commonwealth v.
Hilbert, 190 Pa. Super. 602, 155 A.2d 212 (1959).
3. Commonwealth v. Razmus, 210 Pa. 609, 611, 60 A. 264, 265 (1905);
accord, Segriff v. Johnston, 402 Pa. 109, 113, 166 A.2d 496, 499 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Hilbert, 190 Pa. Super. 602, 607, 155 A.2d 212, 215 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Shinfield, 83 Pa. Super. 292, 298 (1924). The purpose of
the rule is to allow the trial judge to remedy the error. Without the rule,
it would be common trial strategy to allow errors to go uncorrected and
then appeal on them. The number of retrials would push the cost of
litigation beyond the means of the average citizen. Finally, the backlog of
cases awaiting trial and retrial would so burden the court calendar as to
make litigation of a particular case an extremely prolonged affair.
4. 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968).
5. Id. at 563-64, 248 A.2d at 304.
6. In Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 248 A.2d 289 (1968), the
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison. The majority affirmed without opinion while Justice Roberts concurred on the basis that since defendant failed to object to the alleged error,
he could not appeal. Id. at 387, 248 A.2d at 289. In Commonwealth v.
Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968), the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder and sentenced to death. He appealed on the basis that
there was error in the trial judge's admonition that he could not confer with
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have two points in common: (1) no objections were taken to
the alleged errors at the time they were committed; and (2) at
least one Justice argued that the errors were "basic and fundamental. '7 These cases become important not only for the queshis counsel during a recess in the trial. The majority agreed this was error
but affirmed the sentence because the error was not objected to. Id. at
573, 248 A.2d at 295. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d
301 (1968), the defendant was convicted of numerous charges. His appeal
was based on an alleged error in the charge to the jury. The conviction
was reversed and a new trial granted on the basis that there had been
"fundamental error." Id.
7. In Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 248 A.2d 289 (1968), the
error was based on confusion in the charge when the trial judge stated that
"[v]oluntary manslaughter consists in the unlawful killing of another
without malice . . . and that means without direct intent to kill....
and "[i]f you bear in mind that manslaughter is never accompanied by
legal malice, that is, by a direct intent to kill. . . " In Pennsylvania the
above statements are incorrect. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walters, 431
Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757 (1968); Commonwealth v. Jordan, 407 Pa. 575, 181
A.2d 310 (1962); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1917); B. LAUB, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE, 281-82, 387-93, 463-65 (1959).
Justice O'Brien in his dissenting opinion, in which Justice Cohen joined,
states: "The act itself can well be intentional without any intent to kill
being present. In view of the fact that the evidence in this case only
barely supports the verdict of first degree murder, I conclude that the
erroneous instructions were definitely prejudicial to appellant." Later he
says: "None of the cases cited by Justice Roberts is inconsistent with this
view that where there is fundamental error in the charge, this Court will not
permit the verdict to stand." Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 397-98,
248 A.2d 289, 294 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
In Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968) the
alleged error centered around the trial judge's admonition to defendant not
to confer with counsel during a recess. It was argued that this was a
deprivation of defendant's right as guaranteed by U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
It was also argued that since the admonition was made in front of the jury
it prejudiced defendant in their eyes. Compare Commonwealth v. Scoleri,
432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968) with United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d
519 (3d Cir. 1950); Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301
(1967) and Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321, 176 A. 908 (1935).
In Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 582, 248 A.2d 295, 300 (1968)
(concurring opinion), Justice Roberts argued for affirmance on the basis
that the failure to object to the above alleged errors precluded a reversal.
As to "fundamental error," Justice Roberts compared the result reached
here to that of Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301
(1968), and indicated his disagreement. While he did not state that the
errors in Scoleri were "fundamental," that conclusion can be drawn from
his opinion.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968), was
appealed on the basis that the trial judge incorrectly charged the jury as to
reasonable doubt. Chief Justice Bell writing for the majority stated:
[W]e . . . believe that the following portion of the Court's charge
amounts to fundamental error: 'If you feel that their testimony
does not substantially do that [prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt], . . . then you are not required to bring in a conviction.'
This portion of the charge gave the jury a right to find defend-

tions they raise as to the "fundamental error" doctrine but also
for Justice Roberts' use of them to advance his own test as to
when an alleged error can be appealed. The test Justice Roberts
advocates is somewhat confusing since the language in his opinions
can be read to support two different theories. In Commonwealth
v. Simon" Justice Roberts states:
[W] e must insist that counsel object to all 9 of those events
which counsel alleges to be error so that the trial court is
afforded an opportunity to remedy the alleged deficiencies
which the trial court determines are valid. Then,10 this
Court will reverse for (1) these errors which were so severe
that any attempt to correct them could not dispel the earlier
taint and (2) those objections which the trial court overruled and which we find meritorious.I
Justice Roberts reiterates this view in Commonwealth v. Williams:

12

[I] consider the failure by counsel for appellant to object
to [the alleged error], or request clarification, conclusive
of this issue.
The proper function of our guilt-determining process neither requires nor assures a defendant an errorless
trial. A defendant is, however, entitled to a fair trial free
of such trial errors as his trial counsel timely sought to
have corrected by calling them to the court's attention.
Trial errors are made in the courtroom and it is there
that the correction process should at least be initiated.
The defense may not successfully complain of trial errors for the first time only after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty, unless the errors were initially challenged at
trial, and thereby preserved on appeal.'8
These excerpts simply reaffirm the rule that a specific objection must be lodged with the trial court before a reversal will
ensue. Justice Roberts uses other language, however, which implies a more complex test. In Commonwealth v. Simon 14 he states
that " .

.

. the relevant standard must be not how severe was

the error, but how easily can it be corrected."' The test is further
developed in Commonwealth v. Scoleri:16 "The correct test for
whether this court will consider an issue on appeal which was
ant guilty even when they had a reasonable doubt, and consequently constituted basic and fundamental and reversible error.
Id. at 567, 248 A.2d at 306.
8. 432 Pa. 386, 248 A.2d 289 (1968).
9. Emphasis added.
10. Emphasis in original.
11. Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 390-91, 248 A.2d 289,
(1968) (concurring opinion).
12. 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968).
13. Id. at 569-70, 248 A.2d at 307-08 (dissenting opinion). See
opinions by Justice Roberts in Commonwealth v. Bruce, 433 Pa. 68,
A.2d 346 (1969) and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 433 Pa. 34, 248 A.2d
(1969).
14. 432 Pa. 386, 248 A.2d 289 (1968).
15. Id. at 390, 248 A.2d at 291 (concurring opinion).
16. 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968).

291
also
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not raised below must hinge upon the ability of the trial court
to have corrected the error if it had been brought to that court's
attention."'1 7 This language implies that where no objection was
lodged and the error was correctible when made, the decision
will not be reversed, but if the error was incorrectible when made
the court may reverse.'
The inconsistency between the sets of quoted sections above
results in two separate tests. This Comment will be devoted to
an analysis of these two tests and the "fundamental error" exception to the general rule. The Comment will also examine the
possible future effect of the recently enacted Pennsylvania Rule
of Criminal Procedure 1119.19
I.

FUNDAMENTAL ERROR TEST

The "fundamental error" exception to the general rule can be
20
traced back at least as far as the 1891 case of Knapp v. Griffin.
In Knapp the court stated in dictum: "[when an alleged error
is not brought to the trial judge's attention] the error would have
to be serious to induce us to reverse .... ,21 This development
became well recognized both in civil 22 and criminal cases 23 by the
early twentieth century.
The benefits derivable from the "fundamental error" test are
two-fold. Regarding the particular case on appeal, the rule allows
17. Id. at 582, 248 A.2d at 300 (concurring opinion).
18. It is of little value to examine earlier cases since it appears that
the test or tests expounded here is stated incompletely in previous cases.
See Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 7, 220 A.2d 634, 636 (1966) (concurring
opinion).
19. The pertinent part of Rule 1119 is section (b) which states: "No
portion of the charge nor omissions therefrom may be assigned as error,
unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate. All such objections shall be made beyond the hearing of the jury."
This section becomes effective August 1, 1968, thus having no effect
on the three principal cases discussed in this Comment which were tried
prior to that date.
20. 140 Pa. 604 (1891).
21. Id. at 616.
22. Medvidovich v. Schultz, 309 Pa. 450, 453, 164 A. 338, 338 (1932);
Philadelphia v. Strange, 306 Pa. 178, 184, 159 A. 7, 9 (1932); Schlossstein v.
Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245, 252-53, 142 A. 324, 327 (1928); Loughrey v. Penna.
R.R. Co., 284 Pa. 267, 271, 131 A. 260, 262 (1925); Stone v. Stone, 277 Pa. 277,
278, 121 A. 500, 501 (1923); Lerch v. Hershey Transit Co., 255 Pa. 190,
196-97, 99 A. 800, 801 (1916); Foley v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 240 Pa. 169,
172, 87 A. 289, 290 (1913).
23. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 546, 168 A. 244, 244-45
(1933); Commonwealth v. Corrie, 302 Pa. 431, 436-37, 153 A. 743, 744-45
(1931); Commonwealth v. Kahn, 116 Pa. Super. 28, 30, 176 A. 242, 243 (1935).

the appellate court to correct errors which have prevented the
defendant from receiving a fair and impartial trial. There is merit
in the oft-quoted statement that "[a] man is not to be deprived of
his liberty and reputation because of the inadvertance of a trial
judge or the carelessness of his counsel in failing to call the
attention of the trial court to palpable error which offends against
24
the fundamentals of a fair and impartial trial.
The "fundamental error" test can also be beneficial to the
judicial system as a whole. When an error is clearly apparent
and of such magnitude that injustice results, respect for the judicial system is lessened by failure to correct that error. The
purpose of criminal convictions are inter alia to punish the perpetrator and deter others from similar acts. Levying punishment
based on an erroneous trial does not further these objectives of
punishment and deterrence. Elevating procedural niceties to a
super-imposing position does not elicit public support for the guiltdetermining process. While procedural rules are necessary to an
orderly administration of justice, they should not be viewed as
ends in themselves.
The "fundamental error" doctrine, however, has a number of
significant shortcomings. For the doctrine to be of value, its applicability must be clearly understood. The cases which refer to
'
the "fundamental error" test speak in terms of "basic [error] , 25
"fundamental error," 26 "basic and fundamental error," 27 "basic
and fundamental error seriously affecting the merits of the case
and imperatively calling for reversal, ' 2 "serious error, '29 'palpable error,"' 0 "extraordinary circumstances,"3 1 and "extremely

24. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 546, 168 A. 244, 245 (1933);
accord, Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321, 323, 176 A. 908, 909 (1935);
Commonwealth v. Wadley, 169 Pa. Super. 490, 494, 83 A.2d 417, 419 (1951);
Comonwealth v. Bird, 152 Pa. Super. 648, 651, 33 A.2d 531, 533 (1943);
Commonwealth v. Wiand, 151 Pa. Super. 444, 449, 30 A.2d 635, 637 (1943).
25. Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 53, 103 A.2d 694, 699 (1954).
26. Commonwealth v. Hilbert, 190 Pa. Super. 602, 607, 155 A.2d 212,
214 (1959); Commonwealth v. Wiand, 151 Pa. Super. 444, 449, 30 A.2d 635,
637 (1943); Commonwealth v. Kahn, 116 Pa. Super. 28, 30, 176 A. 242, 243
(1935).
27. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321, 323, 176 A. 908, 909
(1935); Commonwealth v. Bushkoff, 177 Pa. Super. 231, 233 n.1, 110 A.2d
834, 834 n.1 (1955); Commonwealth v. Bird, 152 Pa. Super. 648, 651, 33 A.2d
531, 533 (1943).
28. Commonwealth v. Pittman, 179 Pa. Super. 645, 647, 118 A.2d 214,
215 (1955); Commonwealth v. Zang, 142 Pa. Super. 573, 577, 16 A.2d 745,
747 (1941).
29. Knapp v. Griffin, 140 Pa. 604, 616, 21 A. 449, 449 (1891).
30. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321, 323, 176 A. 908, 909
(1935); Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 546, 168 A. 244, 245 (1933);
Commonwealth v. Wadley, 169 Pa. Super. 490, 494, 83 A.2d 417, 419 (1951);
Commonwealth v. Wiand, 151 Pa. Super. 444, 449, 30 A.2d 635, 637 (1943).
31. Commonwealth v. Mays, 182 Pa. Super. 130, 132, 126 A.2d 530,
531 (1956).
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extraordinary circumstances. '32 All these terms are on the same
level of abstraction and therefore offer no guide as to what degree
of error will call into play the "fundamental error" test. There
is no clear delineation of what comprises "fundamental error."
In short, "fundamental error" is what the court says it is. This
inherent vagueness leads to further problems. Since a criminal
defendant cannot determine whether a particular error is fundamental, he is likely to be optimistic about reversal and therefore
initiate an appeal. Thus, the defendant exhausts additional funds
in what usually results in an affirmance of the conviction. The
large number of unwarranted appeals is also detrimental to the
legal system by congesting the court calendar, thereby obstructing
other more meritorious cases.
Another detriment of the "fundamental error" test stems from
the fact that the defendant can use the test as a sword rather
than a shield. The "fundamental error" doctrine was devised to
shield the defendant from conviction based on an erroneous trial.
The doctrine becomes a sword, however, when the defendant,
allowing the error to pass unchallenged, takes a chance on acquittal while fully aware that he has the option of seeking a new
trial based on the alleged fundamental error. The appellate
court reviewing the above situation is only concerned with determining (1) whether there was error; and (2) if so, was it
fundamental. They have no way of differentiating carelessness
on the part of defendant's attorney from an intentional act.
Justice Roberts relied heavily on this problem in criticizing
the "fundamental error" doctrine. In his dissenting opinion in
Williams,3 he states:
The majority now . . . encourages defense counsel to sit
by silently without calling errors to the trial court's attention until after the guilty verdict is returned....
I suggest that the majority now not only approves
and encourages such trial silence, but more tragically
places a distinct premium upon such strategy. This may
well become one of the frequently used techniques of trial
counsel for obtaining a new trial-simply do not seek to
4
have errors corrected before the jury retires to deliberate.
This defense strategy has long been recognized by the courts and
is often cited for support of the general rule that an appeal cannot
be raised on a point which was not objected to when committed.85
32. Commonwealth v. Landis, 193 Pa. Super, 373, 376, 165 A.2d 110,
111 (1960).
33. 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968).
34. Id. at 570, 248 A.2d at 308 (dissenting opinion).
35. See discussion p. 496 & note 3 supra.

While the argument that the "fundamental error" doctrine is
used as a common defense tactic appears valid at first glance,
closer scrutiny is necessary. Due to the inherent vagueness of
the "fundamental error" doctrine, few trial attorneys could predict with any degree of accuracy when an appellate court would
apply it to particular facts. In a close case the defense attorney
would want as many factors as possible favorable to his client in
hopes of receiving an immediate acquittal. To allow prejudicial
errors to go to the jury and rely on an appellate court's application
of the "fundamental error" doctrine would be hazardous; the
"fundamental error" doctrine is not that predictable. This reasoning is not infallible in all close cases, but would probably hold
true in a majority of them.
In the case where defendant has almost no chance of acquittal, however, the defense strategy would more likely be employed. If the defense counsel senses imminent conviction, he
would be strongly tempted to allow an error to pass unchallenged
and then appeal, hoping that the appellate court would find the
alleged error fundamental. But this situation also has tempering
factors: (1) appellate courts only infrequently find that an error
is fundamental, and (2) the prosecution may call the error to the
court's attention. While it is unlikely that the prosecution
is interested in protecting the defendant's rights, it is vitally concerned with protecting the trial record. An alert prosecutor would
be foolish to allow prejudicial error into a strong prosecution
case, thereby giving defendant a basis for appeal.
Thus the argument that the "fundamental error" doctrine will
be used as a defense tactic appears to be less valid than was
initially assumed. This is not to say that the defense-tactic-argument is completely invalid, but rather it will not come into extensive use.
The final shortcoming of the "fundamental error" test stems
from the difference in connotation derived from the written as
opposed to the spoken word. The jury listens to the witnesses'
testimony and the charge given by the judge; they are subjected
to the totality of the trial. The appellate court, on the other
hand, experiences the trial only vicariously by way of the printed
record. Neither emotion, inflection, nor demeanor of witnesses
can be conveyed. What may appear to be serious error on paper
to the appellate court may actually have been harmless and sufficiently deemphasized as to have had no impact on the jury.
Similarly, there is a difficulty in evaluating whether one part of
erroneous material is corrected by the
a charge which contains
36
charge as a whole.
While the entire system of appellate review can be criticized
on the above basis, yet it seems that the "fundamental error"
36. But cf. Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 387, 248 A.2d 289,
289 (1968) (concurring opinion).
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doctrine is especially open to this attack. The legal determination
of particular wording as error per se is difficult; the correct determination of the degree of error, fundamental or harmless, borders on the impossiblef 7 Again, this problem stems from the
vagueness of the term "fundamental error." With no clear acknowledgement of what the term represents, its application will
appear haphazard. Justice by chance, or even the appearance of
unequal treatment, will destroy public confidence in the legal
system.
II.

ROBERTS' FIRST TEST

As previously stated, it is not clear what test Justice Roberts
advocates.38 Briefly stated they are: where no objection was
taken at the time the error was committed, (1) no decision will
be reversed or, (2) only those errors are reversible which were
incorrectible at the time they were made.
The most appealing aspect of Justice Roberts' first test is its
certainty. Unless an objection was lodged at the time the error
was committed, no reversal will ensue. This certainty is welcome
as an alternative to the vague "fundamental error" doctrine. The
predictability of the test will have the immediate effect of reducing the number of appeals as well as the number of retrials.
Additionally, many defendants will benefit by saving the expense
of useless appeals.
The onus imposed by this test is on a defendant's attorney to
protect his client from trial errors, thus relieving the appellate
court of the role of a "super-trial-defense counsel." 9 This result
places a premium on the competent attorney and does not allow
an escape hatch for those attorneys who are careless or unprepared. As a final result this test prevents the use of the defense
tactic of allowing errors to slip by unchallenged to create a record
which will allow reversal. As discussed earlier, 40 this tactic is
probably not widespread, but any use of it, no matter how slight,
-hould be discouraged if possible.
37. Compare Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 387, 248 A.2d 289,
289 (1968) (concurring opinion); Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 220 A.2d 634
(1966) and Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958)
we'th Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968); Comm)nwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 168 A. 244 (1933) and Commonwoealth v. Norris, 87 Pa. Super. 66 (1925).
38. See discussion p. 498-99 & notes 8-18 supra.
39. Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 570, 248 A.2d 301,
308 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
40. See discussion p. 501-02 supra.

Despite its benefits, the "no appeal without objection" test
has major drawbacks. The principle one being that the test is
more concerned with form than substance. This is not to say
that an objection is purely procedural, for its use does necessitate
the investigation of substantive elements. To refuse to correct
clear errors because no objection was taken, however, is to elevate
a quasi-procedural rule to an overbearing position. The purpose
of the trial, as stated by the late Justice Musmanno in Segriff v.
Johnston,41 "is the ascertainment of truth and the production of
justice. ' 42 The "no appeal without objection" test is not designed
to attain either of these goals.
A second criticism of this test is that it only decides the
question when an appeal can be taken. It does not touch the
problem of when an error should be reversed after an objection
has been properly raised. It could be argued that these are two
distinct problems and the "no appeal without objection" test was
not intended to solve the latter. Yet since the two problems are
to and those
so closely tied one rule which controls errors objected
43
where no objection was raised would be beneficial.
III.

ROBERTS' SECOND TEST

The second test attributable to Justice Roberts is: when no
objection is raised, only those errors which were incorrectible at
the time they were made will be reversed; if the errors were
correctible, no reversal will ensue.44 An example of a correctible
error involves the situation set out in Commonwealth v. Williams 45 when the trial court stated in the charge: "If you feel
that [the prosecution has not proved its case beyond a reasonable
doubt] based on the credibility of the witnesses, then you are not
required to bring in a conviction. '46 The error could have easily
been corrected by calling the court's attention to the legally erroneous statement. An example of an incorrectible error is the
prosecution's mention of an alleged confession which had previously been determined to be inadmissible. No amount of instruction by the court could remove the prejudice to defendant.
In this situation, the "reversible only where incorrectible error"
41. 402 Pa. 109, 166 A.2d 496 (1960).
42. Id. at 115, 166 A.2d at 500 (dissenting opinion).
43. The "fundamental error" test by contrast answers both these questions, but in reverse order. First, the court must decide whether the alleged
error is fundamental. If they decide it is fundamental they will then allow
a hearing of that error. If, on the other hand, the court initially decides
that the alleged error is not fundamental, the case is affirmed. The affirmance, however, is based on the general rule that when no objection is
taken, no reversal will ensue. Thus, the second question-degree of
error-must be answered before the first-when can an appeal be taken.
44. See discussion p. 498-99 and notes 14-18 supra.
45. 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968).
46. Id. at 562-63, 248 A.2d at 304.
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test would allow a reversal although defendant's counsel did not
object.
It appears that this test has its roots in earlier cases. For
example, the test can be implied from the language in Commonwealth v. Razmus: 4T "A party may not sit silent and take his
chances of a verdict, and then, if it is adverse, complain of a
matter which, if an error, would have been immediately rectified
and made harmless. ' 48 Where this language was used, however,
the court always determined that the errors were correctible and
therefore affirmed the decisions. 49 In no case does the court
apply the "reversible where incorrectible" part of the test.
Application of the test would have a number of benefits. The
test is more equitable, as compared to Justice Roberts' first test,
in situations where an objection could not have corrected the
error. Justice Roberts' first test does not allow a reversal unless
an objection had been lodged, while in his second test an ineffective objection to an incorrectible error is not a prerequisite.
Thus, a useless act is not required. The defendant's counsel still
has the burden of pointing out errors which are correctible, for
in that situation no reversal is allowed without the objection.
This second test is still susceptible to the much criticized defense
tactic of allowing errors to slip by hoping for a later reversal.
Such use would be restricted to a small number of cases, however,
due to the difficulty in distinguishing between correctible and
incorrectible error.
This test, however, has real disadvantages. Extreme examples
of the difference between correctible and incorrectible errors are
readily ascertainable, but not all errors are so easily categorized.
In those latter situations uncertainty would be as much a problem
as is created by the present inherent vagueness of the "fundamental error" doctrine. The convicted defendant, unable to determine if an error not objected to is correctible, will appeal
arguing that the error was incorrectible. Thus, the courts will
be as burdened by excessive appeals as is presently the case under
the "fundamental error" doctrine, with the resultant extra costs
upon the hapless defendant.
Another disadvantage is that the test is based on correctibility
rather than severity of error. The appellate courts are unable
to correct clearly severe errors which were correctible at the time
47. 210 Pa. 609, 60 A. 264 (1905).
48.
49.

Id. at 611, 60 A. at 265 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., cases cited note 3 supra.

they were made. No amount of rationalization can make this
result equitable. If a severe error was committed which deprived
defendant of his life or liberty, some means of correcting the
situation should exist.
Finally, under this test, the court may be faced with two
difficult decisions: (1) whether the error was incorrectible, and
(2) if so, whether it was sufficiently grievous to require reversal.
The court could decide that while there was incorrectible error,
it was harmless or that the error was grievous, but correctible
when made. In both those situations, they would properly affirm
the conviction. Only where the error was incorrectible when
made and grievous would a reversal ensue. 50

IV.

ACCEPTANCE OF "FUNDAMENTAL ERROR" TEST

After a close investigation of all three tests-the "fundamental
error," the "no reversal without objection," and the "reversible
where incorrectible" doctrines-it is clear that none of them is a
panacea. While all of the tests have benefits, they also have
significant disadvantages. The proper resolution of this conflict
is not in deciding which test has less disadvantages, but rather
which is most beneficial. Ultimate fairness to a criminal defendant is submitted to be the most important requirement. The
purpose of a trial " . . . is the ascertainment of truth and the
production of justice." The fundamental error doctrine with the
recommendations listed below best achieves ultimate fairness.
The disadvantages of the "fundamental error" test stem from
the vagueness of the test. To correct this deficiency the appellate
courts should take every opportunity to state specifically why an
alleged error is held to be either fundamental or not fundamental.
Such opinions will enable the legal community to recognize those
areas which are considered fundamental to a fair trial. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 51 Justice Bell did set out the reason for
finding "fundamental error" when he stated: "[The error alleged]
gave the jury a right to find defendant guilty even when they
had a reasonable doubt, and consequently constituted basic and
fundamental and reversible error. 512 A one sentence rationale,
however, is inadequate in light of the indecision surrounding the
"fundamental error" test. Justice Bell assumed that the reader
will supply the following steps in the logic: (1) reasonable doubt
has been universally recognized as an absolute essential of Anglo50. Under the "fundamental error" test, only the second question
above is significant. The court would only be interested in whether
"fundamental error" had been committed.

Correctibility of the error has

no bearing on the outcome of the appeal. Thus, the "fundamental error"
rule in this aspect is simpler to apply.
51. 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968).

52. Id. at 567, 248 A.2d at 306.
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American jurisprudence; (2) a defendant cannot be convicted
where there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt; therefore, (3)
a charge which allows the defendant to be found guilty on less
than reasonable doubt is fundamental error. The risk of overexplaining a rationale is far less dangerous than leaving any pos53
sible doubt as to the court's thinking on a particular issue.
These opinions will then develop a case law sufficient to remove
the disadvantages surrounding the application of the doctrine.
This case law development is dependent on consistent application of the standards set forth by the courts. If reasonable doubt
is "fundamental" to a fair trial, then all cases which deprive
defendant of this right should be reversed. If a particular error
is not "fundamental" in one case, then a later case, without more,
should be decided similarly. In situations where two previously
determined "non-fundamental errors" taken together create "fundamental error," the court should explain why the sum is greater
than the parts. These recommendations will reduce the problems
surrounding the application of the "fundamental error" doctrine
in a moderate amount of time.
V.

PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1119 (b)

As of August 1, 1968 the following rule will govern erroneous
charges: "No portion of the charge nor omissions therefrom may
be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto
before the jury retires to deliberate. All such objections shall be
made beyond the hearing of the jury." 54 No case has yet been
decided on the basis of Rule 1119(b). If the courts interpret the
rule strictly, it will effectively preclude the use of the "fundamental error" doctrine as applied to erroneous charges. The rule
is also susceptible, however, to the interpretation that it is a
mere codification of the general rule and will not be applied in
situations where "basic and fundamental error" has been committed. Due to the long use of the "fundamental error" doctrine
in Pennsylvania, the latter interpretation is more likely. In that
case, Rule 1119(b) will have no effect on appellate decisions. Even
53.

Not all issues are as clear as a resonable doubt question.

See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 387, 248 A.2d 289, 289 (1968)
(concurring opinion) (alleged error as to the elements of manslaughter);
Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968) (denial of constitutionally required right to counsel); Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa.
543, 168 A. 244 (1933) (alleged mistake in judge's restatement of facts);
Commonwealth v. Russo, 187 Pa. Super. 140, 144 A.2d 485 (1958) (waiver of
statute of limitations).
54. PA. R. oF CnnI. PRoc. 1119(b).

assuming that the rule is interpreted strictly, the "fundamental
error" test will not be entirely abandoned. Since the rule only
applies to errors in the charge, the test is still applicable to errors
which occur during the main body of the trial. As previously
stated, the "fundamental error" test is a valuable adjunct to the
general rule. Therefore appellate courts should lean towards an
interpretation of Rule 1119(b) which will allow continued use of
the "fundamental error" doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The present application of the "fundamental error" test has
significant faults. There should be a remedy, however, for major
errors which affect the life and liberty of criminal defendants.
Of the three tests reviewed, retention of the "fundamental error"
doctrine is suggested. The test can be improved by a clear delineation of what elements are necessary to a fair trial. Cases
previously decided have relied on abstract terms not helpful to
the trial judge or the practitioner. Only the well-thought use
of concrete explanations will alleviate this problem and provide
case law to guide the legal community through this presently
confusing area.
DONALD R. RIGONE

